Denial of Bosnian genocide is rooted in Serb and Croat religious nationalism and Islamophobia.

Unresolved and manipulated memory continue to haunt the Balkans. It is a fundamental mistake, however, to accept the false narrative that “Balkanization” is an intractable “truth.” Balkanization implies that people are separated by exclusive national/ethnic identities that make them prone to war and to live in perpetual hostility. This construct is a relatively recent development articulated by 19th century nationalism. One of the difficulties in learning about what happened here in the 1990s is realizing that this narrative was/is used to not only promote exclusive ethnic identities and destroy the multiethnic and pluralistic identities of Bosnia; it was/is also accepted as the justification for the world to turn away. Accepting a construct such as “Balkanization” reduces our understanding of what was and is possible. There are competing tensions between exclusive nationalism as well as the opposite; a respectful sharing of multi-ethnic and multicultural identities. This essay should be read as an opening to further reading and inquiry.

The Sarajevo Haggadah

Jews and Muslims share a history of targeting and persecution in the Balkans. In 1492, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella expelled Jews and Muslims from the newly unified kingdom of Spain. During the expulsion Sephardic (Spanish) Jews escaped with a Haggadah (an illuminated manuscript contains the story of the Israelites’ Exodus from Egypt — retold each year on Passover during the Passover Seder) that originated in Barcelona around 1350. It is one of the oldest Sephardic Haggadahs in the world. In the diaspora that followed, many Jews and Muslims made their way to Sarajevo.1 Sarajevo became a haven for interfaith culture where the Haggadah was revered and protected. It was perhaps the only major European city never to have a ghetto for Jews. Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo are proud that they had a hand in preserving the Haggadah from Spain with its tolerant, cosmopolitan culture.

In modern times, Muslims rescued the book twice. In 1942, Sarajevo was under the heat of Nazi Germany and its ally, the Croatian Fascist Ustaše led by Ante Pavelić. Pavelić wanted his new Croatian state to be “cleansed” of Jews and Serbs.2 When Nazi general Johann Fortner (who also commanded a vicious Croatian Fascist regiment known as the Black Legion) arrived and demanded that the manuscript be turned over, the National Museum’s chief librarian, Derviš Korkut, risked his life and smuggled the Haggadah out of Sarajevo. It was believed to have been hidden in a mosque. In 1992 during the Bosnian War, Serb forces besieged Sarajevo and shelled the national Museum intent on destroying the cultural heritage of Bosnia. The Haggadah was once again rescued by the city’s Muslim population.

This interfaith, multiculturalism is precisely what nationalists abhor.

“Christoslavic” Serb Ideology

The creation of national identities (who belongs and who does not) was a product of 19th century nationalism. The Serbian construct of its national identity began to fixate on a minor battle in Kosovo on June 26, 1389.3 Serb intellectuals

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3 For more on Serbian national identity and Kosovo, see: Brainier Anzulovic, Heavenly Serbia, (New York: NYU Press, 1999).
transformed the death of the historic Serb Prince Lazar into a Christ-like myth representing the sacrifice, death, and resurrection of the Serb nation. Lazar was captured during the battle and before he was killed he assassinated the sultan. This action became a guiding legend for the role of Serbs in their relationship with Slavic Muslims. Muslims were transformed in the Serb national narrative into “Turks,” the murderers of Lazar and the destroyers of Serbia. Muslims were seen as religious and race traitors, having “polluted” the Slavic “race.” The Serb narrative did not accept Muslim identity and saw Muslims as weak cowards who had rejected their Serb identity. Serb nationalism would seek to punish Muslims in perpetuity in ways that echo the deicide myth of Christianity that condemned all Jews in perpetuity for the death of their fellow Jew Jesus. The deicide myth and the Serb myth would prove to have lethal consequences.

As part of the development of the Serbian national identity another myth was created that envisioned an ancient Serbia as a stable, uniform ethno-religious group. On June 28, 1892, St. Vitus Day became an official holiday in the Orthodox Church which allowed Serbs to reflect upon these new “truths.” “Christoslavic ideology” focused on the idea that a battle was looming to save Christian values and identity. It was no coincidence that Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip sparked World War I when he assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914. Princip is still revered as a hero in Serbia. Under Slobodan Milošević Slobodan (Serbian President, 1989-1997 and President of the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” 1997-2000) genocide would become a sacred act, a religious duty, worthy of communion and forgiveness of sins by a Church that would support this crusade.

Superordinate Identity | The Former Yugoslavia

Marshall Tito, the Partisan hero of World War II, held Yugoslavia together amidst a history of political, economic, and cultural conflict, as well as ethnic tension. Yugoslavia was created after World War I in 1918. The formerly independent Kingdom of Serbia’s royal House became the Yugoslav dynasty. In 1946, after World War II, it became the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1963, the country was renamed again as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The six socialist republics that made up the country were the Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Serbia contained two Socialist Autonomous Provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. These two provinces were removed from Serbia in an attempt to protect the rights of people where no clear ethnic majority existed.

Although people of the former Yugoslavia (with the exception of Albanians) shared a Slavic identity, ethnoreligious identities, were problematic. Croats are Roman Catholic, Serbs are Orthodox Christians, and Bosniaks are Muslims. Tito subordinated these identities to the Yugoslavian (“land of the South Slavs”) vision of “Brotherhood and Unity.” Serbia, however, continued to control the national narrative in schools and cultural events.

In 1974, constitutional reform allowed for more regional national autonomy and decentralization. A collective presidency of eight provisional representatives and a federal government with little control over economic, cultural, and political policy was created. Serbia, resenting that Vojvodina and especially Kosovo remained autonomous, rejected decentralized, and were especially angered that the 1974 constitution recognized Muslims as an ethnicity for the first time. Until then, the only choice Muslims were given in Yugoslavia when selecting ethnicity was to declare themselves “undecided” (neopredjeljeni). Marshal Tito died in May 1980.

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Destroying Multiethnic Culture: Manipulating Nationalism and Christianity

Slovenia was the first Republic to begin to break away from Yugoslavia after the death of Tito. Liberalization and democratic reforms increased its openings to the West.

Slobodan Milošević, Serbian President (1989-1997) and President of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (1997-2000), a communist party leader in Serbia, began a campaign against Slovenia under the guise of a believer in "Yugoslav unity." With control of the press, Milošević seized an opportunity to fulfill his own ambitions while also promoting the cause of Serb nationalism. Milošević coordinated a series of summer/fall protests for "constitutional changes" while targeting opponents with demonstrations he coordinated with supporters of Serb nationalism. He specifically targeted the communist leadership in Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The League of Communists of Serbia under Milošević began removing provincial leaders and local politicians in what became known as the "anti-bureaucratic revolution" and replaced them with Milošević loyalists. The West feared ethnic wars in the Balkans and as Milošević began to cement his power base, Western powers welcomed his narrative that he was only seeking to hold Yugoslavia together. After all Milošević was seen as trustworthy as he had been a banker with many friends in NYC. Despite CIA warnings, they saw him as Tito’s successor. He began to devise a plan for an expansion of a “Greater Serbia” wrapped in reformist garb of “rescuing” Yugoslavia.

Kosovo

It was Milošević’s wife Mirjana who suggested to him that, “The time has come to back Kosovo Serbs.”

The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was seen as an institution that melded Yugoslavian identity together. In 1988. Serbs pushed through unconstitutional reforms restructuring its command and deployment and placed command in Belgrade. Although the army had a strong Serb bias (Bosniaks could not train as pilots for example) purges began to reshape the army from the peoples’ army to a more nationalist force. A majority of the officers were now Serb. Serb officers who rejected the reshaping of the army were murdered. The JNA was not yet loyal to Milošević, but with Serb intentions clear, Catholics and Muslims no longer wanted to serve and were allowed to leave.

In 1989 Milošević began a crackdown on Albanians living in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians (Muslims) had been facing repression since 1981. Utilizing the Christoslavic national narrative the Serb media began to talk about an ‘international Muslim conspiracy with genocidal goals’ for Serbians living in Kosovo. This claim, by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, was supported by the Vatican and Germany.

1989 | Kosovo & Montenegro

On January 11, 1989, after two days of Serb-sponsored protest, the leadership of Montenegro stepped down. Serbs began to draft a new Yugoslavian constitution that would take away Kosovo autonomy and make it part of Serbia. On February 19, 1989, Kosovo miners went on hunger strike and much of the province joined the miners in protest. The protest gained support in Slovenia and Croatia. On February 27, 1989, 1,500 federal police troops under Serbian leadership began a campaign of oppression of Kosovo Albanians. On February 28 Milošević blamed the strikes on popular Kosovar Albanian

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8 Sells, The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia, 65.
leader, Azem Vlasi and leaders of Slovenia. Serb TV stoked anger and Belgraders took to the streets shouting, “We want weapons!! We’re going to Kosovo!”

On March 9 more strikes and arrests mark the start of a long period of passive resistance by the ethnic Albanian majority before a guerrilla war broke out in 1998-99. On March 15-16 Lawrence Eagleburger, George HW Bush’s Secretary of State stated: “There is no question in my mind that Milošević is in terms of economics a Western market-orientated fellow… [who] is playing on and using Serbian nationalism, which has been contained for many years, in part I think as an effort to force the central government to come to grips with some very rough economic problems.”

On March 28, the Serb National Assembly ratified a new constitution after interrogating and threatening Albanian representatives. (Only 10 of the 190 vote against.) The ceremony was attended by Western ambassadors.

Legacy of WW II

The fears, trauma, and experiences of World War II could be easily manipulated for nationalist ends. Croatia had allied with Nazi Germany and Serbia had been occupied and run by a puppet Nazi government. Croatian Ustaše militias carried out a Nazi agenda while being supported by the Catholic Church. One of their most notorious concentration camps was Jasenovac, an extermination camp established in Slavonia by the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia during World War II. The Ustaše killed 400,000 Croatian Serbs, along with tens of thousands of Jews, Roma, and Communist Partisans. 12 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs were murdered in Jasenovac. 13 For their part, the Serb Chetniks battled Croats, Nazis, Yugoslav partisan fighters, while also occasionally helping the Nazis. Serbia had a puppet Nazi regime which set up several camps for Jews and other minorities. 14 The Serbs had reason to fear Croatian nationalists and Croatians disliked and distrusted the Serbs. On the other hand, Serb Chetnik forces committed genocide against Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sanjak region, with the aim of establishing an ethnically clean Greater Serbian state. 15

International Context

Yugoslavia was seen as a buffer during the Cold War. As part of the nonaligned movement Yugoslavia was not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. When Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 he attempted to modernize the Soviet Union with Perestroika (reform) and Glasnost (openness). It was a thawing of the Cold War and it was seized upon by Western countries hoping that Gorbachev’s reforms would reduce tensions. The position of the United States was to support Gorbachev and help him to prevent chaos if the Soviet Union began to unravel. Yugoslavia lost its importance as a Cold War buffer. As Yugoslavia began to break apart after the death of Tito, United States policy remained consistent. It would support the continuation of a “unified” Yugoslavian state. This played right into the hands of Milošević despite the dire warning of an October 18, 1990 National Intelligence Estimate by the CIA:

Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup. [...] a full-scale interrepublic war is unlikely, but serious intercommunal

10 Glaudric, The Hour of Europe, 38.
11 Ibid, 40.
conflict will accompany the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter. There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity.\textsuperscript{16}

**Back in the USSR | Tblisi, Georgia, USSR**

To keep the Soviet Union together soviet leaders had to use force. Gorbachev was no exception. As republics clambered for independence, Gorbachev clamped down. On April 9, 1989 Soviet troops were ordered by Gorbachev to ruthlessly crush a peaceful protest in Tblisi, Georgia. Twenty-one people were killed, dozens were injured, and hundreds suffered from tear gas. As the U.S. policy was to keep stability in the USSR by supporting Gorbachev, the U.S. did not support the pro-democracy demonstrators and Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor signaled U.S. acquiescence, “We have no dog in this fight.”\textsuperscript{17}

Events in the USSR would shape events in Yugoslavia. The lack of a U.S. reaction to the protest in Tblisi gave a clear signal to Milošević who wanted to deal with Kosovo. On May 8, 1989, Milošević became President of Serbia. On June 28, 1989, he conducted what, can best be described as, a medieval passion play stoking Serb nationalism at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. Over 1,000,000 Serbs went to Kosovo on a national pilgrimage and heard Milošević give his nationalist vision for a “Greater Serbia.” Church iconography was ever-present. By mid-1989 Kosovo and Vojvodina were reintegrated into Serbia and the Montenegro leadership was replaced by Milošević allies. In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell and communist dictatorships were toppled. With the fall of Communism, elections would be held that would bring nationalist parties into power.

**Genocide’s Early Warning Signs**

Sheri P. Rosenberg rightly pointed out that “Genocide is a process, not an event.”\textsuperscript{18} There are a number of risk factors that contribute to a country’s leadership choosing to use genocide to meet its goals. Often it is in moments of transitional political instability where new power bases try to replace the old. Risk factors increase if exclusionary ideology exists, a state is isolated, and minority elites manipulate ethnic and religious cleavages. All of these were present in Yugoslavia in 1989.

**1990 Elections in Croatia and Slovenia**

As elections approached for Croatia and Slovenia they were declared illegal by Jović, the Yugoslav president, as they were, in his view, seeking to break up the federation. Franjo Tuđman, leader of Croatia, saw an opportunity. He was an antissemit and Croatian religious nationalist who wanted to “Europeanize” (cleanse) Bosnian Muslims and Serbs from a “Greater Croatia.” The Catholic Church supported this Croatian nationalism which sought to expand Croatia’s borders. Milošević, meanwhile, continued to enflame Serb nationalism by encouraging Serb enclaves throughout Yugoslavia. This growing tension spilled over into Croatia where Serb tourists clashed with Croats on Dalmatian coast.

On May 14, the day before the newly elected parliament would convene, the JNA (Yugoslav People’s Army) confiscated Slovenia and Croatia’s Territorial Defense Forces (TO) weapons. Again, this was inspired by the actions of the USSR when they had done this in Lithuania in March/April. Slovenia was able to salvage nearly a third of its weapons, but Croatia was caught unprepared and was effectively disarmed. That is, with the exception of Serb-populated areas in Croatia that got to keep their weapons and were even given more by the JNA.

As Serbia acted aggressively to undermine other republics, Milošević continued to portray himself as a man of ethnic reconciliation, protector of Serbia and Yugoslavia, who was promoting economic stability and peace. “With us there is no


\textsuperscript{17} Glaudic, The Hour of Europe, 170.

uncertainty he claimed. Some Serbs may actually have believed this and saw outsiders as meddling in internal Yugoslavian affairs.

**U.S. is Focused Elsewhere**

In August 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and U.S. policymakers shifted their attention to stopping Iraqi aggression. CIA predictions about the growing danger of Milošević were ignored. As violence grew in Croatia, President Bush ignored overtures from Croatian leaders while listening only to the Serbs. Because of the invasion a Kuwait, companies in Bosnia Hercegovina (BiH) faced a crisis as they relied on trade with Iraq and Kuwait. An economic crisis ensued in Yugoslavia. BiH and Macedonia continued to contribute to the Yugoslav federal budget, but Milošević, the self-proclaimed Yugoslavian patriot, did not. In December, Milošević illegally appropriated money from Yugoslavia to pay for costs of the summer elections and to prepare for war.

The Croatian leader Tuđman saw another opportunity to promote his vision of a “Greater Croatia” and called BiH an “artificial colonial creation” which he hoped to divide between Croatia and Serbia. He began to reach out to Milošević.

**Milošević in Trouble | Milošević Saved**

On January 13, 1991, Soviet forces killed and wounded hundreds in a crackdown in Lithuania. On January 16, Milošević met with Western ambassadors to announce his goals for a greater Serbia to include BiH. The U.K. and France supported the plan.

On January 17, the U.S. began bombing Iraq during the first Gulf War. Everything seemed in place for Milošević. And yet, things began to unravel. In the spring of 1991, the Serbian economy was in trouble. Violence in Croatia between Serb and Croat radicals increased as JNA tanks moved through BiH towards Croatia. As a sign of his weakness Milošević agreed in June to divide up BiH with the Croatian president Tuđman. As war seemed imminent, Germany shifted dramatically, condemned Milošević and Serbia for radicalizing things, and put their support behind Croatia.

**Wars to create a “Greater Serbia”**


On June 22, Slovenia and then Croatia on June 25, 1991 declared their independence. Milošević decided to attack Slovenia. The War with Slovenia lasted from June 27 – July 7, 1991. It was a fiasco for the JNA and Milošević. The army was not prepared and Slovenia won the public relations war by presenting itself as a “democratic victim of a Communist attack.” Slovenia would soon become independent in part because of its successful defense, but also because Milošević could let it go as it did not have a substantial Serb population. In this mist of these disasters, both economic and military, Milošević was rescued.

Milošević once again played the role of the “last hope” to keep Yugoslavia unified. As Slovenia broke away he sowed fear in the West by describing the violence as “ancient hatreds” (Serb national myth) that he was working to contain. The U.S. supported this and stated that ‘those Balkan people are irrational’. Focused on Iraq the U.S. turned the problem over to

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20 Glaudric, The Hour of Europe, 103.

21 Little,ilder, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation, 154.

On July 5 1991, Germany pushed E.C. ministers to suspend financial aid and institute an arms embargo. On September 25 the U.N. instituted an arms embargo on Yugoslavia. This was an attempt to stop the flow of weapons into the Balkans with the belief that this would curtail the violence. Their actions would unwittingly secure Milošević’s position. He was the first to praise this ‘move towards peace’ and raise his profile as a ‘peacebuilder.’ In reality, he had saved the JNA image from the fiasco of the Slovenian War, won the army’s loyalty, and, most importantly, ensured that the JNA now had all the weapons.

A (failed) Coup in USSR | War in Croatia | August 1991

On August 19 1991, a Soviet military coup seized power and arrested Gorbachev. The plotters then approved of a Serb invasion of Croatia in support of their ally Milošević. For once the E.C. was upset by Serb actions, or more specifically, Milošević’s support of the coup against Gorbachev.

On August 26, 1991, a gleeful Milošević ordered the JNA to attack Croatia with a goal of ethnic cleansing of Croatian populations in order to recognize Serb enclaves and shift the border. Ethnic cleansing began in eastern Slavonia. Slovenia remained on the sidelines and awaited the independence that Milošević had told them he would support. The E.C. denounced “elements” of the JNA and “Serbian irregulars” for the war, but not Milošević.

On October 6 the Bosnian leader Alija Izetbegović declared BiH neutral and called for Bosnians not to respond to the JNA call up. The JNA failed to mobilize new troops in Montenegro or BiH and started to lose the war in Croatia. Yugoslavians were shocked when the Serbs shelled the Adriatic port of Dubrovnik that was a favorite vacation spot. Meanwhile in the north the city of Vukovar became a symbol of Croatian resistance.

A Perfect Storm Grows: Genocide Warning Signs

As the Serbs attacked Croatia, Croatian nationalists began to fight for a “Greater Croatia.” “Ethnic cleansing” would soon become part of the lexicon. Fueling the violence was a lack of international political will or cohesion in facing the crisis. The U.S. was distancing itself, but supported the U.K. policy of working with the U.N. to preserve Yugoslavia. There were still lingering effects from World War II as the U.K. was wary of getting involved in another European conflict and did not trust the Germans who were once again supporting Croatia. Ironically, as the West supported Serbia, Germany was working through the E.C. to find a road to peaceful dissolution of Yugoslavia. Germany was acutely aware of its recent history and worked to avoid a repeat of it in the Balkans. The Germans also worked to further human rights in Croatia. A final factor for Western apathy was its willingness to accept the Serb narrative of Islamophobia. Fear of Muslims was a powerful force (then and now) in interpreting what was happening. Muslim Bosniaks were marginalized and degraded as “other” and the West accepted the Serb myth that they were radical, fundamentalist Muslims seeking to overthrow Christian Europe. Nothing could be further from the truth. It was true that a small force of radical fighters entered Bosnia later in the war. The main reason for their being there was their exploitation of the desperate Bosniaks who were isolated and denied the right to defend themselves because of an arms embargo.

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23 Glaaurdic, The Hour of Europe, 133.
On October 1991 U.N. envoy Cyrus Vance, former Secretary of State, left Belgrade convinced that Milošević was someone he could trust. He warned the E.C. to back away from threatening Milošević. He argued that singling out Serbia for blame and punishment was unjustified and counterproductive.²⁴

Plans for a war for “Greater Serbia” in Bosnia developed as Bosnia prepared to declare its independence. On October 12, 1991 an irate phone conversation between the founders of the Serb Democratic Party (Republika Srpska) took place about the potential independence of Bosnia.

![Gojko Dogo (left), a famed nationalist poet and reportedly an unofficial Bosnian Serb representative in Belgrade spoke to Karadžić (right):](image)

Dogo: “Burn everything and good bye! ... Up north of Dubrovnik River kill everybody.”

Karadžić: “In two-three days Sarajevo will disappear, and there’ll be 500,000 dead. In a month, there will be no more Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina.”

Dogo is heard commenting, "They should all be slaughtered. All of them."²⁵

According to the judgment of the ICTY Appeals Chamber in 2013: “...in meetings with Karadzic ‘it had been decided that one third of Muslims would be killed, one third would be converted to the Orthodox religion and a third will leave on their own’ ...”

At the same time (October 1991) NATO commander General Galvin stated: “I am convinced that the Serbs could have been stopped in October 1991 with three ships, three dozen planes and about three thousand men deployed in Dubrovnik and Vukovar...”²⁶

**Turning Point – Vukovar**

On November 18, 1991, Vukovar fell to the Serbs and faced a murderous rampage by Serbian-led military and paramilitary forces. Germany pushed for recognition of an independent Slovenia and Croatia. The U.K. and the U.S. worked to use the U.N. to halt E.C. (German-led) initiative. On December 4, Germany won recognition for the independence of Slovenia and Croatia by correctly arguing that the Yugoslav War was a war of Serb conquest, not a civil war. Germans helped Croatia to craft constitutional law based upon human and minority rights hoping that the Croatians will follow it. In January 1992, French President Mitterrand (who had ironically worked for Vichy and refused to apologize) argued: “Croatia belonged to the Nazi bloc, not Serbia.”²⁷ Regardless, in January 1992, a ceasefire went in place and international recognition was won for the two new republics. Germany would pay a high price for this success as it was effectively removed from influence and future negotiations.

Milošević’s plan was crumbling especially with new E.C. talk of recognizing BiH. Milošević was a failure! His mobilization efforts in Serbia had failed and Serb lines were stretched against the highly motivated Croats. Milošević was anxious for U.N. troops to insert themselves on the Croatian border.

²⁴ Glaudric, The Hour of Europe, 244.
²⁵ Ibid, 238.
²⁷ Mark Almond. Europe’s Backyard War: the War in the Balkans. (Mandarin, 1994), xii.
1992 was the critical year in the unfolding atrocity. Radovan Karadžić, leader of the Serb Democratic Party in the Serb autonomous regions of Bosnia, established the autonomous state of “Republika Srpska” in northern and western Bosnia. He armed paramilitaries in preparation to fight for Milošević and began a campaign of “ethnic cleansing.” He threatened to bring the same “road to hell” in BiH as in Croatia.

Krajina (Croatian Serbs)

In January 1992 Krajina Serb leaders established the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) within Croatia. To protect them Milošević called for U.N. help. Milošević worked to secure a U.N. peacekeeping force in order to stop Croat advances. In February 1992, the U.N. supported Milošević’s plan to put peacekeepers in four regions of Croatia. A U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was deployed to Krajina. The E.C. proposed a deal to appease the Serbs for a co-federalization of BiH into three ethnically divided states (Serbs, Croats, Muslims). The idea was supported by Tuđman (Croatia). There was hope (which proved to be false) that Serbs would be satisfied with the proposed 43.8 % of Bosnia. In Gow’s *Triumph of the Lack of Will*, he called this the “Charter for Ethnic Cleansing.”

Izetbegović, the Bosniak leader, noting the obvious problem, asked Cyrus Vance for a limited U.N. deployment along Bosnia’s borders with Croatia and Serbia. This would have been a major check on Serbian preparations to invade. Vance rejected the idea mistakenly believing that he needed Milošević to get the peacekeeping operation going in Croatia.

On March 1, 1992, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Muslims and Croats) declared independence with 99.7% in favor and apply for E.C. recognition. The Bosnian Serb party (SDS) boycotted the referendum.

War in Bosnia & Herzegovina | April 1992 – December 1995

On April 2, 1992, Bosnian Serbs, Serb Special Forces (“Tigers” and “White Eagles”), and the JNA attacked BiH. The war soon spread across the country, accompanied by the ethnic cleansing of the Bosniak and Croat populations, especially in eastern Bosnia.

On April 7, 1992, the U.S. recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. It was too late and not enough. The delay in recognizing Bosnian independence, the failure to monitor the borders of BiH, and its support of Milošević were huge misjudgments.

On April 6, 1992, the shelling and siege of Sarajevo began. It would last for three and a half years. Of the half million inhabitants, more than 12,000 would die in the forty-three month siege. The Serbs, driven by their exclusive ethnoreligious nationalism also sought the cultural annihilation of Bosnia. Like elsewhere in Bosnia, Serb targets in Sarajevo included museums, mosques, schools, art, and historical cultural treasures that debunked the Serb myth of separate ethnoreligious identities. Once again, a CIA study reported that the bulk of Serbian artillery and armor around Bosnian cities were so vulnerable to air attack that 95% could have been taken out in a single day.

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The E.C. response to the siege was to travel to Sarajevo to convince Izetbegović to surrender. Lord Carrington (U.K.): “You, Mr. Izetbegović, are not aware who you are dealing with. They have several thousand tanks, several hundred military planes, between two and four thousand artillery weapons, stocks of ammunition and weapons, are you aware of it? How do you think you can resist?” After years of supporting and encouraging Milošević the E.C. solution was to bully Izetbegović. The E.C. did not change their approach during the summer 1992 even as ethnic cleansing and genocide was reported.

On May 2, 1992, Serb forces cut off Sarajevo and attacked vital parts of the city including the Presidency building. The next day, May 3, 1992, Bosnian forces stunningly beat the Serbs back. The Serbs had arrested Izetbegović at the Sarajevo airport, but had put him in an office with a functioning phone. He was able to call his deputy who hastily arranged the defense of the city.

**Six Strategic Objectives of the Serbian people in BiH**

The genocidal policy that developed for Bosnia and Hercegovina was not an ad hoc project. It was crystallized as policy in response to the shock of the failure in Sarajevo (the Serbs thought they could take Sarajevo in days from the poorly armed Bosnians). The Bosnian Serbs, on May 12 constructed “Six Strategic Objectives of the Serbian people in BiH” (Bosnian Serbs). This “project” was supported and financed by Belgrade, using the so-called Republika Srpska as its proxy to achieve its territorial objectives of a “Greater Serbian” state. The goals included: separation of ethnic communities in the country, establishment of the borders of “the Serb people’s territories” between the Drina, Una and Neretva rivers, erasing the Drina River as the border between the Serb part of Bosnia and neighboring Serbia. One of the goals was the division of Sarajevo. It was a warrant for genocide. On the same day, Ratko Mladic was appointed the commander of the newly formed Bosnian Serb Army. Mladic accepted the charge of the six strategic goals and its genocidal intent by saying, “people are not keys or coins to move from one pocket to another.”

The majority of the territory targeted by the six objectives was populated by Bosnian Muslims. Occupation was only one of the goals. Očistiti (to clean up) was a term first used by Yugoslav military officers in 1992 in reference to their Bosnian Muslim neighbors. Based on the systematic abuse, humiliation, rape, torture, and murder that followed, the aim went beyond removal of unwanted populations and focused on the annihilation of Bosniak culture at the micro level as well. The anti-Muslim bigotry was not aimed at all Muslims, but only at Slavic Muslims. This would be a campaign to “cleanse” a new homogeneous Serbian state. The document was used to convict Karadžić in his later trial at the ICTY. Karadžić’s goal: “We are on both sides of the Drina and our strategic interest and our living space are there.” One of the goals was to eliminate the Drina River as a border and annihilate the non-Serbs living there.

**Demographic Engineering**

The twentieth century is full of studies of state-forced resettlement policies and the targeting of minorities to achieve ethno-national homogeneity and “security.” Sometimes ethnic groups were offered incentives to resettle, but more often, these resettlements were violently executed and fueled by real or imagined threats. Demographic engineers sought to reinforce ethnic divisions and differences. The Six Strategic Objectives was yet another In a long line of “ethnic cleansing” projects. In 1928, for example, paragraph 55 of the Yugoslav Citizen Act regulated the relocation of unwanted non-Slavic

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30 Glaurdic, The Hour of Europe, 300.
citizens to Turkey. The intended targets were mostly Albanian Muslims. The Turks were skeptical that the Albanians could be assimilated. In 1934, Turkish authorities enacted Settlement Law No. 2510 that specified how immigrants and refugees would be assimilated into the Turkish nation. In 1935, the “Inter-Ministerial Conference on the Resettlement of the Non-Slavic Element from Southern Serbia” between Yugoslavia and Turkey targeted which ethnic groups would be expelled and resettled in Turkey. In 1935, the Yugoslav authorities were impressed by the Turkish-Romanian agreement on the resettlement of Romanian Muslims in Turkey. The Nazi project of the “Final Solution” (the Holocaust/Shoah) was rooted in the demographic engineering plans of the SS and the German government that were radicalized in Poland in 1939-1941. These projects were fresh in the memories of Serb and Croatian planners. In 1937, Vaso Ćubrilović, a member of pre-World War I Young Bosnia Slavic student group and participant in the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand on June 28, 1914, wrote a pamphlet entitled ‘The expulsion of the Albanians.’ He later became a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. His pamphlet emerged again in the 198os when Serb nationalists were focusing on Kosovo.

In May 1992, the Serbs began to segregate Bosniak and Croats in northwest Bosnia and sent Bosniaks to concentration camps. The Western press got news out about Serb concentration camps (around 3,000 were killed in the Prijedor camp alone). Mitterrand called the Serb offensives, “unfortunate initiatives” while Serb propaganda continued to portray Bosniaks as Islamic fundamentalists who wished to establish a Muslim state in the Balkans. Other, smaller scale, yet brutal camps emerged amongst Croats and Bosnians. Often these camps were developed at the local level on individual initiative as hostage-taking centers with the goal of exchanging prisoners for family members interned in Serb camps.

Genocide is the destruction of social identities and the reduction of identity. By now Muslim identity was reduced to two questions: Are you circumcised? Do you have a Muslim name? Bosnian Serb nationalists, JNA, paramilitaries, and “weekend warriors” conducted “ethnic cleansing” including curfews, forced relocations, rape, castration, imprisonment in concentration camps, and killings. Journalist Mark Danner describes the Serbs’ plan of attack as:

1. Concentration – urge Serb residents of the city to leave, while surrounding the town and bombarding it with artillery fire.
2. Decapitation – execute the leaders and intelligentsia of the town.
3. Separation – separate the women, children, and old men from the men of “fighting age.”
4. Evacuation – move women, children, and old men to concentration camps or national borders.
5. Liquidation – execute the men of “fighting age.”

The Serbs conducted systematic rapes in rape camps (often schools) as a tactic of “ethnic cleansing.” It is estimated that a minimum of 20,000 rapes (female mostly, but also male) took place from 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia. Towns and villages throughout the country were attacked and destroyed by Bosnian Serb Military and Police forces, committing genocidal massacres. The victim’s bodies were dumped into hidden mass graves. Hundreds of mosques and other Islamic religious sites were destroyed, erasing all physical memory of Bosniak presence in these lands.

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In the fall of 1992, the world ignored a desperate appeal by the International Committee of the Red Cross to stop the atrocities. Instead, the West kept its arms embargo in place – a violation of Article 51 of U.N. Charter which guarantees that every recognized nation has the right to defend itself. In October 1992, a “no-fly zone” was declared over Bosnia, but for months the West ignored its own declaration. The Bosnians were not asking for any troops to intervene to save them. They just wanted arms to defend themselves.

**Mostar**

The city of Mostar on the Neretva River was a symbol of tolerance: a shared life of Jews, Christians (Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats) existing side-by-side with the Bosniaks-Muslims for more than four centuries. This was intolerable for Serb and Croat religious nationalists.

The city suffered through two sieges. The first began in the spring of 1992 when Serb forces attacked. Croats and Bosnians beat them back. In the spring of 1993, Croat religious nationalists, seeing Serb atrocities going unpunished and rewarded in international peace negotiations, decided to attack BiH. This time Mostar was besieged by Croats and the Serbs. Each fought the other while the Bosnians tried to hold onto the city from both attackers. Most of the city was destroyed and on November 9, 1993 (ironically, the anniversary of Kristallnacht, the Nazi pogrom), to maintain an isolated Croatian identity, the Croat army destroyed the Stari Most bridge, the symbol of tolerance and hope.

**U.S. Fails to Lead**

President Bill Clinton continued to vacillate. Clinton considered unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia and authorizing limited air strikes on Bosnian Serbs, but this was motivated by a desire to keep America out of the conflict. Clinton began reading about the Balkans, but unfortunately chose *Balkan Ghosts* which fed the Serb narrative of ever-warring tribal peoples and also *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* with its strong pro-Serb and anti-Muslim narrative. Both made a strong impact on Clinton and he changed his policy to one of inaction. Additionally, Clinton was haunted by Vietnam (its “lessons” ironically did not apply to Bosnia) and Somalia where in 1993 19 US soldiers were killed in Mogadishu. In the summer of 1994, Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher reluctantly appointed Richard Holbrooke as assistant secretary of state and tasked him with trying to end the Balkan war. Holbrooke had quickly concluded that the Serbs were the aggressors and wanted the arms embargo lifted so that the Bosniaks could defend themselves.

**Srebrenica**

By 1995 the Croatian army was the strongest military force in the war. Milošević, sensing his window for success was closing, decided to seize as much territory as possible and preserve his own power seeking a peace deal which might lift crippling UN sanctions. The Bosnian Serbs were not pleased and tensions grew between leaders in Republika Srpska and Serbia. General Mladic, also reeling from his daughter’s suicide, went into action.

Srebrenica seemed to be a safe haven. Protected, at first reluctantly by the U.N., many refugees came here. Srebrenica (12,000) swelled with 40,000 refugees. A Bosnian resistance also defended the town. Towns in eastern Bosnia (Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde) remained under the control of the Bosnian government. The U.N. had declared these enclaves “safe havens” in 1993, to be disarmed and protected by international peacekeeping forces.

In April 1995, after Mladic had failed to seize other Bosnian towns, Serb forces blocked the entry of supplies to Bosnian civilians in Srebrenica. Conditions deteriorated quickly and the Bosnian force was ordered to leave. The Bosnian Serbs updated their six strategic objectives. The Serb strategic plan is ‘upgraded’ by Directive 4 and Directive 7 issued by Srpska President Karadžić to the Bosnian Serb Army several weeks before Srebrenica and Zepa fell. Radovan Karadžić added
Directive 7: “By planned and well-thought out combat operations, create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica.” According to General Ratko Mladic, “The time has come to take revenge on the Turks of this region.”

On July 11, 1995, Serb forces under General Ratko Mladic took Srebrenica. The U.N. commander, Dutch General Karremans, befriended Mladic and ignored what was unfolding. Hasan Nuhanović, the Bosnian translator for Dutch forces in Srebrenica brought his family into the U.N. base to protect them. About 20-25,000 Bosniak refugees fled from Srebrenica towards the nearby town of Photocrati. Some arrived outside the U.N. compound where a Dutch battalion protected a supposed U.N. “safe area.” On July 12, 1995 Mladic began the “evacuation” of Srebrenica refugees. He promised them safe transport and assured them not to be afraid, but he had no intention of protecting them. What followed was indeed sinister. Women and children were separated from the men and older boys. The women were bussed to sites where many were raped or assaulted. The men and boys who remained behind were killed or bussed to sites where they were tied up and shot. 15,000 tried to escape into the hills. To avoid the minefields the Serbs have put down, the column had to march in single file. Some would survive the minefields and Serb ambushes. Others did not.

On Thursday, July 13, 1995, Ramo Osmanovic was captured with hundreds of exhausted men trying to flee over the mountains. The Serbs forced him to call his son, Nermin, telling him they would be exchanged for Serb prisoners. The father’s call to his son was recorded by the Serbs. Both father and son were later discovered in a mass grave. No one who surrendered to the Serbs survived. In nearby Kravica village, hundreds of prisoners were packed into a warehouse where they were slaughtered by gunfire and grenades. 8,372 people were murdered in the Srebrenica genocide. Of the 15,000 who fled on the “march of death” only 7,000 survived. After the “evacuations” from Srebrenica the Dutch commander Karremans forced Hasan Nuhanović – UN translator’s - family to leave the U.N. compound. Hasan stayed behind. His family was later discovered in numerous mass graves. Hasan wearing his father’s glasses discovered in a mass grave (right).

Rwanda

Elsewhere, other unfolding atrocities did not cross the threshold of concern. Hutu leaders, the ethnic majority in the east-central African nation of Rwanda, received the message loud and clear: Genocide pays off and the world does not care. The Rwandan genocide took place from April to July 1994. The Hutus murdered as many as 800,000 people, mostly of the Tutsi minority.

Remembrance | Memory | Memorialization

There are no memorials marking the mass graves in Republika Srpska. In Kravica the memorial cemetery for the Srebrenica genocide has a competing Serb memorial falsely claiming “3267” Serb killed in Kravica. Serbs continue to deny the Srebrenica genocide despite the forensic and real time U.S. intelligence imagery. An estimated 1400 mosques and religious administrative buildings (birth, property records…) were destroyed by Serb and Croat forces. Cultural annihilation impacted the perpetrators as well – depriving them of evidence of five hundred years of interreligious and multi-confessional culture.

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Ending the Bosnian War

In the spring/summer of 1995 a Croat-Bosniak offensive pushed the Serbs out of territory in Croatia and northern Bosnia. U.S. President Bill Clinton had authorized a private company to use retired U.S. military personnel to train the Croatian army. Croatian forces took Krajina with little resistance. The U.S. also made a key shift in policy to conduct air strikes against the Serbs if they continued to threaten the Bosnian safe areas or refused to negotiate a settlement. In February 1994, four Serb aircraft had been shot down in the no-fly zone around Sarajevo. It was NATO’s first-ever use of force. In May 1995, NATO conducted air strikes on the Serb stronghold of Pale. In July 1995, after the Srebrenica killings, the Dole-Lieberman bill required the U.S. to lift the arms embargo. The isolationist and nationalist wing of the Republican Party opposed lifting the embargo and President Bush argued that more guns would only fuel the violence. In August 1995, after Serbs refused to comply with a U.N. ultimatum. After Serb units shelled the Sarajevo marketplace in late August, NATO conducted three weeks of air strikes on Serb positions. President Clinton dispatched Richard Holbrooke to the Balkans to negotiate a peace deal.

In autumn Karadžić and Milošević agreed to enter negotiations. The Serb economy was crippled due to U.N. sanctions. The Croatian army, Bosnian army and Bosnian Croat militias were ordered to stop their advance on the request of President Clinton in order to create a ceasefire. On September 1, 1995, U.S. special Balkan envoy Richard Holbrooke announced that all the parties would meet in Geneva for talks. When the Bosnian Serbs did not comply with all of NATO’s conditions, NATO air strikes resumed. On September 14, after days of NATO air strikes on Serb positions, Holbrooke succeeded in getting an agreement signed by Karadžić and Mladić, the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, to end the siege of Sarajevo, laying the framework for the Dayton peace talks in November. Bosniak leaders were not pleased that NATO strikes had been halted.

The war ended just as Bosnian and Croatian forces had turned the tide with their successful offensive that reversed Serb territorial gains in a matter of weeks. The Bosnian Serb army was collapsing and Croatian and Bosnian forces were just miles from Banja Luka. Milošević begged Holbrooke not to let Banja Luka fall and the U.N. actually backed down to an empty Milošević threat that he would step up vicious attacks (that he was denying doing) unless there was intervention. On November 21, 1995, Holbrook, fearing a refugee crisis that Milošević had argued would destabilize Serbia if Banja Luka fell, sided with the Serbs. He threatened Izetbegović, the Bosnian leader, with NATO airstrikes if the Croat-Bosnian offensive against the Serbs continued. Holbrooke would later regret two decisions: Pressuring the Bosnians into accepting the name Republika Srpska and not letting Banja Luka fall in October 1995. Saving Republika Srpska meant that there would be no winners or losers on the battlefield. This would directly influence the peace negotiations.

The Dayton Accords

“TheThanks to Dayton, Karadžić’s Serbs snatched a victory from the jaws of defeat, the Republika Srpska was consolidated and Bosnia was condemned to permanent dysfunction.” - Marko Attila Hoare

Milošević was desperate for a peace accord as it would rescue him from the disaster he had created. He feared a coup or even an assassination. Tuđman, the Croatian president, had won the Balkan Wars and had successfully ethnically cleansed his country, with the exception of eastern Slavonia, and wanted to solidify his gains. Izetbegović saw the negotiations as blackmail, but feared prolonging the war that had been so devastating to

his people. During the exhausting negotiations led by Holbrooke, Milošević revealed his new found anxiety with his Bosnian Serb allies and his urgent need for a deal by offering an undivided Sarajevo to the Bosniaks as their capital. Serb nationalists wanted the city divided into factions. When negotiations ended, Izetbegović (who never imagined that Milošević would ever concede) rightly concluded that even though the fighting had stopped, the “peace” was unjust. In that the Clinton administration’s foreign policy was barely defined, Holbrooke’s objective had simply been to stop the fighting. The Serbs were rewarded with territorial gains they had won through ethnic cleansing. Many of their Six Strategic Goals had been achieved. Republika Srpska was carved out of Bosnia through atrocities and was awarded international recognition. The deal imposed no direct obligation on the NATO-led peacekeepers to arrest war criminals. Bosnia was divided between a separate Croat-Bosniak federation (51%) and a Serb republic (Republika Srpska) (49%). Bosnia would have three presidents (one from each of the three main ethnic groups) 14 legal systems, and 152 ministries guaranteed that nationalists would keep winning elections and would rule along ethnic lines that would produce cronyism and corruption. In the end, Milošević was hailed as the “savior of Dayton” for his last minute agreement to the accords.

Kosovo War: March 5, 1998 – June 11, 1999

The Kosovo Liberation Army (K.L.A.) formed in 1991 had been fighting Serbs and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) since 1995. Having lost three wars and hurt the economy, Milošević continued to worry about his legacy. To save it, he decided to at least take back Kosovo. He attempted to “ethnically cleanse” Kosovo in 1998. In March 1999, after Serb forces had killed Albanian civilians, NATO issued an ultimatum demanding that the Serbs leave Kosovo. Milošević ignored NATO the demand and NATO forces bombed Kosovo to protect the Albanian population. In response, Milošević ordered the Serbian army to attack Kosovo creating a mass expulsion of Kosovar Albanians. The Serbs conducted a campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo as NATO bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days (March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999). This NATO bombing marked the second major combat operation in its history, following the 1995 campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In June 1999, Milošević finally gave in and was arrested for war crimes. Kosovo was divided between its various populations with an international force keeping the peace. This international intervention at a very early stage of the ethnic cleansing prevented much larger atrocities and massacres.

Justice?

CBiH (Sarajevo) and ICTY (the Hague)

The Tribunal has indicted 161 individuals. While most of cases were against Serbs or Bosnian Serbs, charges were also brought against defendants of other ethnic groups, including Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovo Albanians for crimes committed against Serbs. Some of the convictions include:

- November 1996: Dražen Erdemović, a Croat who fought for the Serbs and took part in the Srebrenica massacres, was the first person to be convicted. He was sentenced to five years in prison.
- April 2001: Slobodan Milošević, President of Serbia was arrested and extradited to the ICC in the Hague. He was accused of involvement in the genocide in Bosnia and war crimes in Croatia. Before the end of the trial, Milošević died from health complications.
• 2001: Serbian General Radislav Krstić, who played a major role in the Srebrenica massacre, was convicted of genocide and sentenced to 46 years in prison.
• 2012: Zdravko Tolimir, Assistant Commander of Intelligence and Security for the Bosnian Serb Army, was found guilty of removing Bosniaks of Eastern Bosnia and was convicted in 2012 and sentenced to life imprisonment on six counts: Genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, extermination, murder, persecution on ethnic grounds and forced transfer.
• 2016: Radovan Karadžić, President of Republika Srpska was sentenced to 40 years for the Srebrenica genocide and other crimes.
• May 2011: Ratko Mladić arrested in Serbia after years of hiding in Srpska. His capture was considered to be one of the pre-conditions for Serbia being awarded candidate status for E.U. membership. On November 22, 2017, Mladić, the “Butcher of Bosnia,” after raging at the Court and being forcibly removed, was convicted of genocide and crimes against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment.
• November 29, 2017: Slobodan Praljak, the Bosnian Croat general who destroyed the Mostar bridge and inflicted other atrocities in an attempt to create a homogeneous “Greater Croatia”, after hearing The Hague Court verdict confirming his 20-year prison term for war crimes, defiantly shouted, “Slobodan Praljak is not a war criminal. I am rejecting your verdict with contempt.” He then committed suicide in the court by taking poison.

In 2007, the International Criminal Court in The Hague decided to define the Srebrenica massacre as genocide and declared that Serbia had violated its responsibility to prevent genocide.⁴⁷

Denial

These convictions are important as it makes denial more difficult. However, in that the Croats and Serbs have generally been rewarded for their “ethnic cleansing” there is still room to maneuver as a nationalist.⁴⁸ Unable to deny the crimes, they blur reality and distance themselves from agency by claiming victimhood and celebrating the perpetrators as heroes. This is a widespread phenomenon and continues to include the government and the churches. Catholic priests organized a prayer meeting for the six Croat war criminals on trial in The Hague and the patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church called the sentencing of Mladic diabolical.⁴⁹

The Croatian daily Jutarnji List put it best with the headline: “We don’t deny the crimes of the HVO [the Croatian Defense Council in Bosnia and Herzegovina], but they weren’t committed intentionally.”⁵⁰ Bozo Ljubic, a deputy in the governing Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, described Praljak’s suicide as a heroic act. Serbia continues to be reluctant to hand over war criminals.

Rebuilding After Dayton?

Twenty years after the start of the war in Bosnia, deep physical and psychological divisions remain throughout society. Many Bosnian schools are ethnically segregated and the country is divided into 10 cantons. It is rare for Bosniaks to learn about the genocide, other than through family. Schools that were used as killing centers were cleaned up and reopened for the next school year. Neighbors had killed neighbors. The majority of the perpetrators went back to the lives that they had led before the war. Corruption and distrust is rife. The economy is struggling to provide jobs. As the Russians are pouring money into Srpska and Serbia many Bosniaks are considering emigrating. And yet, UNESCO money is coming in to

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⁴⁹ Ibid.
support the Bosniaks. In once thriving Muslim villages, mosques are being rebuilt – mostly as assertions of life. Despite the difficulty, there is a sense of hope. In 2004, the Old Bridge and much of the Old Town of Mostar were restored with the contribution of an international scientific committee established by UNESCO.

And yet...

As the United States had failed to secure a just peace and has begun withdrawing from the world stage, a woman living in Sarajevo named Aida was troubled. Watching the news about the presidential campaign in the United States that would bring Donald Trump to power, she began to experience insomnia brought on by PTSD. As she watched the Trump rallies she was transported back to a time when those faces echoed those of a couple of decades before who embraced exclusionary nationalism as a way to vent their perceived grievances, rage, and need for an enemy. Fears continue to grow that American isolationism and incoherent foreign policy is abdicating its position as hopeful beacon in the world. It would seem that authoritarian nationalists have an ally in Washington. In October 2018, Milorad Dodik, a Serb nationalist who denies the Srebrenica genocide, was elected to the Bosnian presidency with the aid of former Trump advisor Steve Bannon. Bannon has been promoting anti-immigration, racism, and right-wing nationalism with his “Movement” think tank. Dodik crushed a multiethnic peace rally in Banja Luka in December 2018.

Where Do We Go From Here?

As we study crimes of mass atrocity and the genocide in Bosnia we have much to reflect upon. We need to examine where our policies went wrong and explore all the opportunities that were missed to intervene to stop the trajectory. How do we make a difference before, during, and after atrocity?

In August 2011 President Obama’s Study Directive brought genocide prevention to the forefront of U.S. policy. For the first time in U.S. history, preventing mass atrocities and genocide became a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility of the U.S. We must recognize that genocide prevention is a national security interest and that nationalism, apathy, and isolationism are not.

As we move forward we must continue to work to hold the perpetrators accountable. Justice, truth, and memory lie at the heart of prevention strategies. Trials and convictions should be publicly televised.

We must recognize and begin to address Christian, U.N., and the West’s complicity. Religious organizations must use this history to actively reflect on a religious identity that is insular and promoted as “superior.” When Catholic pilgrims come to Medjugorje in Hercegovina they cannot be limited to seeing only their religious site. As crosses dominate the landscape often overlooking annihilated Muslim villages, no Christian should leave Bosnia without touching upon the history of the genocide. We must seek the best in religious traditions and that can only be accomplished if those traditions are open to self-reflection, openness, and engagement of other traditions.

We must find a readiness to work with and learn from others and not fear plurality. We must increase our capacity for empathy and compassionate action and discover what is good in our different faith and ethnic traditions. We must ask, “how does your tradition help us build peace?”

We must recognize and respond to attempts to marginalize and villainize Bosnia. We cannot accept the myth-makers who would explain away genocide through the false narratives of “Balkanism”: “civil war,” “blame on all sides,” “age-old antagonisms,” or “protecting Europe from radical Muslims.” We must recognize that Islamophobia undermines us all.

We must tell the story of the Sarajevo Haggadah as a counter-narrative to “Balkanization.”

We must support and fund Bosnian national memory and education.

We must build peace.

The Cohen Center is proud to work with The Center for Peacebuilding from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their mission is Naš put je mir (our way is peace). Working with the future generations from all traditions, The Center for Peacebuilding rebuilds trust and fosters reconciliation among the people of Bosnia—Croats, Serbs, Bosniaks, and others—as well as supporting peace processes in other countries that have suffered from violent conflict.

http://unvocim.net/eng/